contract" and orders federal district courts to compel arbitration when one party has failed, neglected, or refused to comply with an arbitration agreement.
Despite this "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," 1 3 a party who is ostensibly bound by an arbitration agreement but wishes not to have a dispute arbitrated may be able to obtain relief from a federal district court." This relief can be sought either prior to the arbitration as an action to avoid the arbitration completely (and have the underlying dispute resolved by a court),' or after the arbitration as an action to change any decision made by the arbitrator.' 6 Whether a court permits a party to challenge an arbitration agreement before or after the arbitration proceeding has important consequences for both parties. Allowing challenges in court prior to arbitration opens the floodgates to litigation, thus defeating the purpose of entering into an arbitration agreement in the first place." On the other hand, requiring a party to wait until after arbitration is complete to raise a challenge in court forces that party to participate in a proceeding to which they may not have validly agreed to submit."
Whether relief can be sought in court before or after the arbitration hearing generally depends on the type of challenge raised. Federal district courts have entertained challenges prior to the commencement of arbitration based on ordinary contract principles such as lack of consideration, unconscionability, and the adhesion contract doctrine.' 9 In addition, when the underlying dispute involves the federal statutory rights of one of the parties, federal courts have heard challenges prior to arbitration based on that party's inability to vindicate its statutory rights effectively through arbitration. 20 11 See 9 USC § 2 ("[Arbitration agreements] shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.').
12 See 9 USC § 4 (stating that if a valid arbitration agreement exists with which one party has not complied, "the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms" of the agreement). 14 The FAA does not grant general subject matter jurisdiction over disputes involving arbitration agreements. Thus, there must be an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity. See Moses H. Cone, 460 US at 25 n 32 ("[The FAA] creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction.... [T] here must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction.').
15 See 9 USC § § 2, 4 (outlining procedures for determining whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists).
16 See 9 USC § 10 (outlining procedures for vacatur of an arbitration award).
On the other hand, two types of challenges to arbitration agreements may be raised only after arbitration has been completed and a decision rendered. These two challenges are attacks on the actual arbitration based on "evident partiality" of the arbitrator' and "fundamental unfairness" of the arbitration.2
Parties to an arbitration agreement may also attempt to challenge the agreement based on institutional bias of the chosen arbitration system. Institutional bias challenges allege the general tendency of an arbitration forum to find consistently in favor of one type of participant over another, for example, employers over employees.2 Unlike challenges to arbitration based on contract principles or an inability to vindicate statutory rights, which may be brought prior to arbitration, or those based on "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness," which may only be brought post-arbitration, it is unclear whether institutional bias challenges may properly be raised before or after arbitration. On first impression it may seem that such challenges better match with the "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness" challenges that can only be raised post-arbitration. This Comment argues, however, that the actual best fit is with those challenges that can be raised prior to arbitration, and that institutional bias challenges should be heard before arbitration commences.
Part I explains and gives examples of institutional bias challenges that have been leveled against various arbitration systems as well as the current conflict regarding proper timing of such challenges. Part II explains the timing of other types of challenges to arbitration and the justifications for the different timing allowances. Part II.A describes those challenges that may be brought prior to arbitration, and Part II.B describes those challenges that may be brought only after arbitration. Finally, Part III compares institutional bias challenges to those challenges discussed in Part II and concludes that courts should entertain institutional bias challenges prior to arbitration.
I. INSTITUTIONAL BIAS CHALLENGES
A. Examples of Institutional Bias Allegations "Institutional bias" is a phrase often invoked but rarely defined. 2 a tendency for arbitration outcomes to favor one class of participants over another. The bias is considered institutional because the causes of the unbalanced outcomes may be widely diffused throughout the entire arbitral system. Both commentators and litigants have leveled charges of institutional bias against various arbitration organizations. Consider, for example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). ICANN's uniform dispute resolution policy governs disputes between domain name registrants and trademark holders with whose trademark the domain name may interfere Two independent studies of ICANN's resolution system indicate that trademark holders have a statistical advantage over registrants in arbitration. Under ICANN's resolution system, only trademark holders may launch complaints.2 The trademark holder brings a complaint with one of four arbitration companies, paying a fee of approximately $1,500.2 Thus, it is in the arbitration providers' best interests to favor trademark holders in order to attract their business in the future. Studies by Milton Mueller at Syracuse University and Michael Geist at the University of Ottawa confirm this suspicion, finding two major areas where bias is evident in the system. First, when trademark holders are allowed to choose the arbitration company, they engage in significant forum shopping, bringing most cases to companies that tend to find in favor of the complainant9 Notably, following the publication of Mueller's report, the arbi-25 See ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available online at <http:lwww.icann.orgludrpludrp.htm> (visited July 5, 2002 ). This system is not identical to the traditional pre-dispute arbitration agreement in which both parties to a potential dispute agree to submit to mandatory arbitration (as in an employment context, for example, where employer and employee both sign the arbitration agreement). In this case, the domain name registrant signs an agreement with a registration company. The registrant agrees to submit to arbitration disputes with trademark holders who are not signatories to the registration agreement. See, for example, DomainRegistry.com Inc. Domain Registration Form, available online at <https:// www.domainregistry.com/register/index.html> (visited July 5,2002) ("By submitting this registration, you acknowledge, accept, and agree, that you understand the following: ... Registrant agrees that if the registration of its domain name is challenged by any third party, the Registrant will be subject to the provisions specified in the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy."). Given that there is legitimate controversy about the institutional bias of various arbitration organizations, the question becomes when and how a party who has signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement can challenge what it perceives to be an arbitration forum structurally biased in its opponent's favor. Courts are split on this question.
The Seventh Circuit has found that institutional bias claims must be postponed until the completion of arbitration. In Smith v American Arbitration Association, Inc,3 a woman contracted to sell her controlling interest in a corporation for $65 million. ' As part of the contract, she agreed to submit disputes to arbitration.40 When a dispute subsequently arose, the woman alleged that the arbitration system was biased because it made it easy for an all-male panel to be selected that would presumably be unsympathetic to her." The court called her challenge "premature," indicating that she could challenge the arbitration after proceedings were complete. 4 2 The court reasoned that by placing an arbitration clause in their contract, the parties chose to trade certain procedural safeguards for savings in time and expense.43 One of the procedural safeguards given up was the power to challenge bias of the arbitration prior to the arbitral resolution of the dispute." Thus, the Seventh Circuit stated, "[t]he time to challenge an arbitration, on whatever grounds, including bias, is when the arbitration is completed and an award rendered."" On the other hand, two other circuit courts have indicated that there may be cases in which, prior to arbitration, a party could demonstrate structural bias to an extent that the court would refuse to compel arbitration. For example, in Floss v Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc, ' employees tried to bring suit against their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 7 As part of their employment contracts, however, the employees had signed arbitration agreements.4 In attempting to avoid arbitration, the employees argued that the arbitration procedures were biased in their at 32. employer's favor." The Sixth Circuit ultimately refused to compel arbitration on other grounds.5 The court implied, however, that if there had not been other grounds for its decision, it would have considered the potential bias prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration.' Thus it appears that the Sixth Circuit would hear certain institutional bias claims prior to arbitration.
Likewise, the First Circuit indicated that it would hear certain bias claims prior to arbitration. In Rosenberg v Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc,2 the plaintiff alleged "structural infirmities" in the arbitration system that would hear her Title VII and ADEA complaints against her employer." Although the court compelled arbitration in that case, it did so because the evidence did not sufficiently establish bias. q The First Circuit is therefore receptive to hearing certain institutional bias challenges prior to arbitration, as well as receptive to potentially refusing to compel arbitration in cases in which that bias can be sufficiently established. It noted that "[p]laintiffs are not required to take their claims to biased panels or through biased procedures."" At first glance, institutional bias challenges may appear to be no different from "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness" challenges that parties may only raise after an arbitration proceeding. However, on further examination of the challenges that parties may raise before and after arbitration, institutional bias challenges appear to present a better fit, both in substance and in underlying justification, with those challenges raised prior to a proceeding.
II. TIMING OF ARBITRATION CHALLENGES GENERALLY
Although the proper timing of institutional bias challenges to arbitration is currently unclear, the law is fairly settled with respect to the timing of other types of challenges. Two types of challenges are permitted prior to arbitration. First, allegations that the arbitration agreement is not valid based on general contract principles are heard 49 See id at 313-14. 50 See id at 314 (invalidating the arbitration contract on the grounds that the promise to provide an arbitral forum was too vague and therefore illusory, and hence could not provide consideration for the contract). forum, we need not decide whether these deficits prevent the arbitration of [employee's] statutory claims.").
52 170 F3d 1 (1st Cir 1999). 53 Id at 14 (noting that the plaintiff had claimed that the arbitrator was governed by the defendant).
54 See id at 16. Once the court found there was not sufficient evidence of bias, it then found that Merrill Lynch had not satisfied its obligations under the arbitration contract. See id at 20. 55 Id at 16.
pre-arbitration. Courts cannot compel parties to submit to an arbitration to which they did not agree. Thus, prior to compelling arbitration, a court must determine that the arbitration agreement is a valid contract. Second, allegations that the arbitration will not allow effective vindication of statutory rights are also heard pre-arbitration. Resolution of disputes involving statutory rights has an element of public interest to it. Whether one citizen is able to vindicate his statutory rights in any given situation is a matter of concern to all citizens. Thus, federal courts may, prior to arbitration, entertain arguments that arbitration would not allow for vindication of statutory rights. Two other types of challenges to arbitration can be brought only after the completion of an arbitration proceeding. First, a party can challenge the proceeding based on the "evident partiality" of the arbitrator. This challenge means that a court can vacate an arbitration award if there is a reasonable impression that the arbitrator was biased. Second, a party can challenge an arbitration based on the "fundamental unfairness" of the proceedings. This challenge allows a court to vacate an award if the arbitration lacked some fundamental elements of fairness such as notice and an opportunity to be heard. These challenges are permitted only after the completion of arbitration for several reasons including respect for the arbitration agreement, and the difficulty in establishing partiality or unfairness of a proceeding before the proceeding has taken place.
A. Challenges Prior to Arbitration
Challenges prior to arbitration generally take the form of a defense to a motion to compel arbitration. The party seeking to arbitrate the underlying dispute brings the motion to compel. They may bring it either as part of a motion to dismiss or stay federal court proceedings if the other party brings the underlying dispute to federal court,n or as an independent action when the opposing party simply refuses to submit to arbitration.? Challenges based on general contract principles are premised on the FAA.' Pre-arbitration review of such challenges are justified on two grounds." First, an arbitrator lacks authority to adjudicate a dispute absent a valid contractual agreement to arbitrate. Second, waiting until after an arbitration has been completed adds nothing to the determination of whether there was a valid arbitration agreement.
Challenges based on an inability to vindicate statutory rights are premised on a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,6 which held that statutory rights may be arbitrated so long as those rights can be adequately enforced.
61 Pre-arbitration review of these challenges is justified on the grounds that the public has an interest in supplying an adequate forum for the enforcement of statutory rights and that post-arbitration review is an insufficient check on this forum.62
1. Challenges based on general contract principles.
Section 2 of the FAA indicates that an agreement to arbitrate between two parties "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Thus, when a dispute arises between parties who are bound by an arbitration agreement, a party may challenge the agreement on general contract principles, arguing that the agreement is void and that the underlying dispute does not have to be arbitrated. For example, federal courts have invalidated arbitration clauses based on lack of consideraton,6 unconscionability," and the adhesion contract doctrine.6 Applicable state law supplies the contract principles a party may use to invalidate agreements to arbitrate, provided, however, that the laws are general in nature and not aimed specifically at arbitration clauses." Arbitration agreements are thus placed "upon the same footing as other contracts." An arbitration agreement is often not a stand-alone contract between two parties, but rather a short clause inserted in a much broader contract such as a contract for sale of goods or an employment agreement. 69 Under Section 4 of the FAA, a federal district court must grant a motion to compel arbitration once it is "satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not an issue." 7 " This section has been interpreted to mean that challenges to arbitration agreements based on general contract doctrines must be made to the arbitration clause specifically, and not the broader contract generally. 7 ' The Supreme Court explains with an example:
[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally7
These latter claims of general contract validity are left for determination through the arbitration.7 2. Challenges based on inability to vindicate statutory rights.
A second type of challenge to an arbitration agreement that may be raised prior to arbitration arises when the underlying dispute involves the federal statutory rights of one of the parties. Disputes by parties who are bound by arbitration agreements frequently involve rights under Title VII, 74 1 These relationships are normally governed by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA"),n which grants parties to a distribution agreement particular benefits such as the right to recover exemplary damages and attorneys' fees.n The arbitration clause at issue in Graham Oil, which covered "any dispute or controversy relating to or arising out of the agreement," forfeited several of these rights." The court noted that nothing prevents parties from arbitrating statutory rights generally and that rights under the PMPA could be submitted to arbitration.! In this case, however, the court found that the arbitration agreement, in forfeiting statutory benefits, violated both the purpose and the specific terms of the PMPA." agreement with his employer). to compel arbitration after an employee filed a Title VII claim." The arbitration agreement covered "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] employment," but indicated that the arbitrator was authorized only to award damages for breach of contract and had "no authority whatsoever to make an award of other damages."" This limitation on damages would have precluded any possibility of receiving Title VII damages in the arbitration, and was thus "fundamentally at odds with the purposes of Title VII." 9' The court, therefore, did not compel arbitration of the employee's Title VII claims because she would not be able to vindicate effectively her statutory claims in the arbitral forum in the absence of the arbitrator's authority to award any damages for Title VII violations.2 3. Justifications for allowing challenges prior to arbitration.
The fact that challenges to arbitration based on contractual grounds are heard prior to arbitration is based on the text of Section 2 of the FAA." Because arbitration is a matter of contract, the authority of an arbitrator to resolve disputes arises only from the agreement of the parties." Before a reluctant party can be forced to submit to arbitration, it must be judicially determined that the parties have contractually agreed to be so bound.9 This inquiry should occur prior to arbitration for two reasons. First, arbitrators have no authority to hear disputes absent a valid arbitration agreement. Second, the outcome of such an inquiry does not depend on what happens during the arbitration. Unlike challenges to arbitration based on "evident partiality" or "fundamental unfairness," which attack the arbitration proceeding itself,; contractual challenges to the arbitration agreement rely solely on events unrelated to the arbitration proceeding. Contractual challenges focus on whether there was a valid contractual agreement to arbitrate. Challenges based on the inability to vindicate statutory rights effectively are not derived directly from the FAA. Instead, these challenges are based on a line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, including Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp and Mitsubishi.n The treatment of statutory rights is different because of the public interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights-an interest that is separate from private parties' interest in resolving a dispute between themselves.9 In order for these rights to be submitted to arbitration, the arbitration must allow effective vindication of them. Any arbitration of a statutory claim that did not allow for effective vindication of rights would "conflict[] with the statute's purpose of both providing individual relief and generally deterring unlawful conduct through the enforcement of its provisions."" While in some cases post-arbitration judicial review could be sufficient to ensure effective vindication of statutory rights, '°1 in at least some cases such post-arbitration review would not be sufficient. For example, in Cole v Burns International Security Services,in the D.C. Circuit placed importance on the fact that an arbitration agreement required a written opinion when it determined that the arbitration at issue would allow effective vindication of Title VII claims.' Presumably, post-arbitration judicial review of a proceeding that had resulted in no written opinion would be impossible, and thus would not offer adequate protection of statutory rights. In such cases, challenges alleging that arbitration would not allow effective vindication of statutory rights must be heard pre-arbitration. 
B. Challenges Following Arbitration
Section 10 of the FAA sets out the situations in which a party may challenge an arbitration award after the arbitration has been completed. 5 An arbitration award may be vacated if it was procured by corruption or fraud, or there was bias or misconduct in the arbitration."' In addition, several courts have endorsed the extra-statutory ground of "fundamental unfairness" for vacating an arbitration award.'O Post-arbitration review of these types of challenges is justified on two main grounds. 5 First, the text of Section 10 lists vacatur of an arbitration award as the only remedy. Second, determining whether there was individual bias or unfairness in a proceeding requires that the proceeding has actually taken place.
1.
Vacatur based on "evident partiality" of the arbitrator.
Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA indicates that a federal district court may vacate an arbitration award if there was "evident partiality" in the arbitrator or arbitrators. I " The text of Section 10 implies that "evident partiality" must be shown by proof of actual bias, a rather high threshold. 5 The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of "evident partiality" in Commonwealth Coatings Corp v Continental Casualty Co. " In that case, a plurality of four justices found that arbitrators must avoid "even the appearance of bias" under the FAA.' However, while two other justices concurred in the result, they did not subscribe to the same "appearance of bias" standard as the plurality. 110 393 US 145 (1968) (vacating an award rendered in an arbitration between a prime contractor and a subcontractor where one of the three arbitrators had a significant undisclosed business relationship with the prime contractor, despite the fact that there was no allegation of actual bias or fraud on the part of the arbitrator).
111 Id at 150. 112 Id at 150-52 (White concurring) (noting that arbitrators should not be held to the same standards of judicial decorum as Article III judges, and that a business relationship between an arbitrator and a party should not result in automatic disqualification).
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Second Circuit noted, "much of [the plurality's] opinion must be read as dicta, and we are left in the dark as to whether an 'appearance of bias' will suffice to meet the seemingly more stringent 'evident partiality' standard of 9 U.S.C. § o.
''
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In navigating these murky waters, several circuit courts have adopted a standard somewhere between an "appearance of bias" standard and the "actual bias" standard that the text of Section 10 implies."' This intermediate standard was expressly formulated by the Second Circuit in Morelite Construction Corp v New York City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds:"-' "[W]e hold that 'evident partiality' within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10 will be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration."" 6 In that case, the court vacated an award made in an arbitration in which the arbitrator's father was a vice president of an international union of which one party was a member."' 7 At least two circuits have expressly adopted the Second Circuit's Morelite formulation."g Additionally, three other circuits have adopted a remarkably similar approach. Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits use a "reasonable impression of partiality" standard to evaluate claims of evident partiality under Section 10. ' The Seventh Circuit also has indicated that an arbitrator who "might reasonably be suspected of partiality" could be disqualified under Section 10(a)(2)."
Under Section 10 therefore, a federal court may vacate an arbitration award if there was partiality on the part of the arbitrator. In examining whether there was partiality sufficient to vacate an award 113 Morelite Construction Corp, 748 F2d at 83. 114 See, for example, id at 83-84 (reading "Section 10(b) as requiring a showing of something more than the mere 'appearance of bias' to vacate an arbitration award," while recognizing that "a standard for partiality as insurmountable as 'proof of actual bias'-as the literal words of Section 10 might suggest," would not be practical). 120 Merit Insurance, 714 F2d at 681 (indicating that Section 10(a)(2) could be read to disqualify an arbitrator reasonably suspected of partiality). under this section, courts have adopted a standard somewhere between "appearance of bias" and "actual bias," adopting some variation of a "reasonable impression of bias" standard.
2. Vacatur based on "fundamental unfairness" of the arbitration.
In addition to the statutory grounds for vacatur in Section 10, some courts have embraced the idea that an award based on an arbitration that was not "fundamentally fair" may be vacated.
1 2 ' Most circuits take the view that the fundamental fairness test is simply an offshoot of the Section 10(a)(3) requirement that the arbitrator be free from "misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. ' ' 2 when an arbitrator accepted into evidence the trial transcript of a criminal proceeding related to the arbitration dispute, but then refused to give any weight to that evidence, the First Circuit held that this refusal justified vacatur of the arbitration award. ' The court cited Section 10(a)(3) and concluded that " [v] acatur is appropriate only when the exclusion of relevant evidence so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing." ' ' One circuit, on the other hand, adopted the fundamental fairness test as an extra-statutory ground for vacating an arbitration award. The Tenth Circuit has distinguished vacatur based on fundamental unfairness from vacatur based on Section 10, holding that "[a]n arbitrator's decision may be set aside only for reasons stated in the FAA, or for a small number of reasons created by the courts, including awards ... where the arbitrators failed to conduct a fundamentally fair hearing.,,l '6 Regardless of its foundation, a majority of circuits have recognized fundamental unfairness as a ground for vacating an arbitration award. The basic requirements of fundamental fairness are "notice, opportunity to be heard and to present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decision makers, and that the decision makers are not infected with bias. ' ' ln Thus, whether the test is justified as an interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act or as an extrastatutory, judicially-created doctrine, most courts recognize that an arbitration award may be vacated if it is the result of a proceeding that was fundamentally unfair.
3. Justifications for postponing challenges until after arbitration.
Some courts have held that challenges based on "evident partiality" and "fundamental unfairness" must be postponed until after the arbitration has been completed. ' 2 This requirement comes in part from the text of Section 10 of the FAA, which allows a district court to "make an order vacating the award." ' '29 If challenges to arbitration based on Section 10, such as "evident partiality" and "fundamental unfairness" challenges, can only be redressed through vacatur of an award, they clearly cannot be redressed until after arbitration.n In addition to this textual argument, postponement makes sense because any bias will only manifest itself in the actual arbitration. 3 ' Permitting partiality or unfairness challenges prior to arbitration would open the floodgates to litigation in circumstances in which the parties may not face bias directly."' Such litigation would be time-consuming and potentially fruitless considering the difficulty in showing partiality or unfairness absent an award, or at least a proceeding, that reflects such bias.'" This type of expensive delay runs "counter to the purpose of the arbitration process in general, and the Federal Arbitration Act in particular, which is to relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would be speedier and less costly than litigation."'"' Additionally, if a district court entertains a partiality or unfairness challenge prior to arbitration, it may interfere with the choice made by parties to an arbitration agreement to "trade off certain procedural safeguards . . .against hoped-for savings in time and expense.' 35 
III. PERMITTING INSTITUTIONAL BIAS CHALLENGES PRIOR TO ARBITRATION
This Comment proposes that courts should entertain institutional bias claims prior to arbitration. The FAA clearly indicates that parties may challenge arbitration agreements on general contract grounds, and as will be shown, there are legitimate contractual grounds on which to base institutional bias challenges to arbitration. Further, for disputes involving statutorily created rights, Supreme Court precedent involving "effective vindication" provides another basis for launching an attack on structurally biased arbitration proceedings. Because institutional bias challenges can be characterized as challenges based on either contractual grounds or an inability to vindicate statutory rights, the justifications for allowing those types of challenges to proceed prior to arbitration'-apply to the institutional bias challenges as well. The fact that institutional bias underlies the contractual or ineffective vindication challenge does not change the fundamental nature of the challenge. 133 See Aviall, 913 F Supp at 833 ("In most cases it is inappropriate and difficult to determine the partiality of an arbitrator absent an award that reflects alleged bias.").
134 Crim, 32 F Supp 2d at 330 (quotation marks omitted). 135 Smith, 233 F3d at 506 (noting that the right to challenge the arbitral forum on grounds other than those provided for by the FAA was one of the procedural rights given up by plaintiff when she agreed to the arbitration clause).
136 See Part II.A.3.
Both of these methods-basing an institutional bias challenge on either a contractual or ineffective vindication claim-allow parties to avoid arbitration to which they ostensibly agreed to submit disputes. This apparently runs counter to the "national policy favoring arbitration,"" which encourages disputes to be resolved in favor of arbitration. However, it is not clear that post-arbitration court proceedings would be able to address institutional bias challenges sufficiently.
A. Institutional Bias Challenges Based on General Contract Principles
Contract grounds for challenging arbitration agreements prior to arbitration are well-suited for application to charges of institutional bias. Consider a claim of unconscionability. In Indiana, for example, a claim of unconscionability requires that there was a great disparity in bargaining power that led the weaker party to sign the contract unwillingly or unaware of its terms, and that the contract was "such that no sensible man not under delusion, duress, or in distress would make [it] , and such as no honest and fair man would accept [it]. ' ' s It is easy to imagine a situation in which an arbitration agreement creates a process or chooses a forum that is institutionally biased against one party such that no sensible person in that party's situation would agree to the arbitration. If there exists great disparity in the bargaining strength of two parties whereby one party is forced to accept the arbitration that is biased against it, the agreement arguably could be considered unconscionable.'" If a party understood the bias at the time of entering the agreement it should not be allowed to argue unconscionability, ' 40 but a party should not be bound to arbitrate in a forum, the inherent bias of which it was unaware.
Lack of consideration may also be a valid contract principle on which to rest an institutional bias challenge. Generally, one party's promise to submit disputes to arbitration can serve as consideration for the other party's promise to do the same. 4 tion is heavily biased in favor of one party, it is as if that party is giving up nothing in exchange for the other party's promise.
Two circuit courts have recently upheld a similar argument. 2 In these cases, the finding of lack of consideration was based on the fact that one party had the ability to modify the arbitration rules and procedures unilaterally without notification or consent of the other party.' 3 There is little functional difference between an arbitral forum that is systematically biased in favor of one party by its nature and an arbitral forum that can be made that way through the unilateral action of that party.'" Therefore, if a party's promise to arbitrate in a forum that it can change unilaterally to favor it is not consideration, and this is functionally equivalent to a party's promise to arbitrate in a forum that is already institutionally biased in its favor, then a party's promise to arbitrate in the latter forum is not consideration. Lack of consideration based on institutional bias is thus a legitimate contractual ground on which to challenge an arbitration agreement.
B. Institutional Bias Challenges Based on Inability to Vindicate Statutory Rights
With respect to arbitration of claims involving statutory rights, such as Title VII or civil RICO claims, the "effective vindication" line of cases provides a solid legal basis for institutional bias challenges prior to arbitration proceedings.' 5 With respect to arbitration of statudo likewise, there is no need to look elsewhere in the contract for consideration for the agreement to arbitrate."). tory rights, the Supreme Court has indicated that courts should refuse to compel arbitration when parties will not be able to vindicate their statutory rights effectively.'" Various circuit courts have held that agreements explicitly limiting the types or amounts of remedies available to parties to arbitration do not allow effective vindication of statutory rights. 47 It is a small step to hold that an arbitration that is inherently biased against a party asserting statutory claims also does not allow for the effective vindication of those claims. There is little relevant difference between an arbitration agreement that explicitly states that an arbitrator cannot award exemplary damages and an arbitration agreement that says nothing about exemplary damages, but submits disputes to a forum that in practice never awards them.
C. Insufficiency of Post-Arbitration Challenges to Address Institutional Bias
The two post-arbitration challenges that are potentially applicable to institutional bias challenges are measured by the "evident partiality"' and "fundamental unfairness."' standards. One could argue that an institutional bias challenge is similar enough to these postarbitration challenges that it too should be heard only after an arbitration is complete. Further examination of the "evident partiality" and "fundamental unfairness" challenges, however, shows that neither would provide an adequate remedy for victims of institutional bias.
First, while the "evident partiality" standard may be sufficient to challenge bias of individual arbitrators, it is not clear that such a standard would allow remedy of certain structural biases. For a court to vacate an award for "evident partiality," a party must allege partiality that is "direct, definite, and capable of demonstration."' '50 To demonstrate direct and definite partiality, a plaintiff must show "specific facts" evidencing that an award was tainted by the arbitrators' partiality.'"' The problem with trying to use the "evident partiality" remedy for challenging the institutional biases of an arbitration forum is that many types of structural bias will never result in specific facts showing that an individual arbitrator was partial.
For example, the Geist study of ICANN's dispute resolution system found that there are two types of arbitrators: those who strictly interpret ICANN rules, and those who take a more liberal approach to the rules. "2 None of these arbitrators may exhibit evident partiality on an individual basis. Strict interpretation of the rules may favor trademark holders while looser interpretation may favor domain name registrants, but an arbitrator may not be biased toward one party simply because he favors one interpretive philosophy over the other. Under these circumstances, no "specific facts" evidencing arbitrator partiality could be alleged. However, if the organization providing the arbitration consistently assigns arbitrators favoring strict interpretation when it claims to assign arbitrators randomly,n the arbitration may be seriously biased against one party. This type of bias would not be addressed sufficiently by an evident partiality standard that looked solely to the bias of individual arbitrators and ignored less concrete forms of bias diffused throughout the entire arbitral system. Indeed, institutional bias challenges made in the form of motions to vacate for evident partiality have not met with much success.'m Because evident partiality has been interpreted to mean something beyond a mere appearance of bias, " 5 the inability of some types of structural bias, such as the ICANN bias described above, to evidence "specific facts" of actual bias in any particular case leaves such structural bias outside the reach of vacatur based on evident partiality.n Similarly, a "fundamental unfairness" inquiry appears insufficient to address concerns of institutional bias after arbitration. The fact that fundamental fairness requires "notice, opportunity to be heard and present relevant and material evidence and argument before the decision makers, and that the decision makers are not infected with bias'" implies that relief could be granted following arbitrations in which institutional bias resulted in an unfavorable award. However, the "fundamental unfairness" approach suffers from the same shortcomings as the "evident partiality" approach with respect to institutional bias. Here too the problem arises in situations such as the ICANN example 
